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Mesa v. Burke: Mental Anguish Damages for Witnessing
Injury to a Close Relation
Maria Mesa was driving with her eleven-year-old daughter when they
were involved in an automobile accident which was solely the result of
the negligence of Mark S. Burke.' The child suffered head injuries which
required treatment in a hospital's intensive care unit, where she remained
unconscious for several days. Upon regaining consciousness, she was
partially paralyzed on her right side. 2
The driver, Maria Mesa, also sustained physical and mental injuries
as a result of the accident. The Mesas brought suit in state court against
the negligent driver to recover damages for Mrs. Mesa's physical and
emotional injuries which were caused by the automobile accident.
Finding that emotional distress occurred in fact, the trial court
awarded the mother compensation for the "mental anguish she expe-
rienced immediately after the accident until her child regained con-
sciousness." 3 In making this award, the trial court found credible Mrs.
Mesa's testimony that "she thought her daughter was dead immediately
after the accident at which time the police officer ... could not find
a pulse on Cynthia.'"4 The defendant appealed the trial court's decision
to the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal. Mesa v. Burke, 506
So. 2d 121 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1987). Although the court of appeal
agreed with the factual finding of the lower court, it did not agree that
the plaintiff deserved compensation for her mental anguish under Louis-
iana law, observing that "[i]t has long been the law of this state that
mental anguish suffered by a bystander as a result of negligent injury
to a third person is not compensable, unless there exists a breach of
some independent duty of care owed to the bystander." 5
The purpose of this note is to examine the history of Louisiana's
bystander non-recovery rule and the justification for not compensating
plaintiffs such as Mrs. Mesa. It will also explore Louisiana cases which,
like Mesa, disallow bystander mental anguish damages while at the same
time express misgivings about their holdings. Finally, this note will
Copyright 1988, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Mesa v. Burke, 506 So. 2d 121, 122 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 506
So. 2d 1226 (1987) (the negligence of the defendant was stipulated to at trial).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 123.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 124.
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consider the position of other states on this issue and Louisiana cases
which show that the courts are developing theories that will aid in the
recovery of mental anguish damages for these plaintiffs.
LOUISIANA JURISPRUDENCE ON BYSTANDER RECOVERY
A. The History of Bystander Recovery
In January of 1855, the Louisiana Supreme Court spoke directly to
the issue of bystander recovery when it held in Black v. Carrollton
R.R.6 that:
[T]he jury cannot ... take into view the shock to parental
feelings, in consequence of the injury to the child, and assess
vindictive damages in favor of the parent-such damages being
recoverable only by those who, in their own proper persons are
victims of the misconduct .... 7
The facts in Black were similar to those in Mesa, as each case involved
a parent witnessing an injury to his child. In Black, a father was denied
mental anguish damages after he saw a train break his son's legs. The
majority in Black explained that "vindictive damages" 8 such as those
for mental anguish should only be recoverable by the actual "victim of
the misconduct." 9
Since Black, a plethora of cases have been decided based on the question
of whether bystander recovery of mental anguish damages should be
allowed when the emotional harm is incurred while witnessing injury to
another. Many of these cases, following the Black rationale, have denied
mental anguish damages to bystanders. For example, in 1906, the Louis-
iana Supreme Court followed Black when it denied a mother mental
anguish damages for the emotional pain which she claimed to have
suffered as a result of the unlawful arrest of her two sons.' 0 Another
example is the 1917 case of Kaufman v. Clark," in which the Louisiana
Supreme Court followed Black and denied emotional damages to a
mother who claimed mental anguish injuries resulting from the defendant
engaging in sexual intercourse with her young daughter. A more recent
example of adherence to the Black rule is the 1965 decision of Laplace
v. Minks,'2 in which the first circuit refused recovery to a father for
6. 10 La. Ann. 33 (1855).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 38.
9. Id.
10. Sperier v. Ott, 116 La. 1087, 41 So. 323 (1906).
11. 141 La. 316, 75 So. 65 (1917).
12. 174 So. 2d 895 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
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mental anguish damages he claimed to have suffered as a result of the
mutilation and subsequent death of his daughter after a car accident.
B. Mental Anguish for Injury to Property
A contrary line of jurisprudence has also developed which allows
a plaintiff in Louisiana to recover for the mental anguish he suffers as
a result of negligent injury to his property. 3 For example, in Brown v.
Crocker,4 a young boy recovered mental anguish damages for the emo-
tional grief he suffered after his horse was shot. The conflict between
this line of cases and Black has caused some courts to have misgivings
about allowing mental anguish damages for witnessing injury to property,
while disallowing these same types of damages for witnessing injury to
a person.
Not all of the cases following Black on the issue of bystander
recovery have been content with the inconsistency between the personal
injury and property damage cases. Some courts follow Black and disallow
the mental anguish damages, but argue that refusing these damages in
all cases is irrational. For example, in Cambrice v. Fern Supply Co.,"5
the court denied the plaintiff recovery for witnessing injury to her son,
but pointed out that Louisiana jurisprudence allows recovery of mental
anguish damages for witnessing injury to property, while, ironically,
witnessing injury to a person is probably even more damaging. The
fourth circuit stated: "[Tlhe mother's grief over the bloodied and torn
clothing of her son might be compensable, but her grief over his bloodied
and torn leg is not.' 6
13. See Romero v. Town of Welsh, 370 So. 2d 1286 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979) (where
plaintiff recovered emotional damages for ruin to his property occasioned by a back-up
of sewage into his home); Deblieux v. P.S. & Sons Painting, Inc., 405 So. 2d 600 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1981) (where mental anguish damages were allowed where injuries to the
plaintiff were the result of a civil trespass on his land). See also Note, Mental Anguish
for Negligent Property Damage, 17 Loy. L. Rev. 438 (1970-1971); and Tete, Tort Roots
and Ramifications of the Obligations Revision, 32 Loy. L. Rev. 47, 112-13 (1986) (dis-
cussing the inequities of allowing "moral damages" in association with contractual duties
while not allowing these damages to parents witnessing the suffering of their child).
14. 139 So. 2d 779 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962). Allowing recovery for the mental anguish
one suffers upon witnessing the loss of one's property, yet not allowing this type of
recovery for witnessing an injury to a close relation is inconsistent. Commen experience
would indicate that in many cases the actual emotional trauma suffered by one upon
witnessing injury to a close relation is of a different type and magnitude than that trauma
suffered by one who witnesses damage to his property.
15. 285 So. 2d 863 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
16. Id. at 866. Ironically, in Todd v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 219 So. 2d 538,
544 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969), the court uses the fact that mental anguish damages are
not awarded for witnessing injury .to one's child as support for an argument that mental
anguish damages for property should not be allowed. In the words of the Todd court,
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Another case which followed the holding of Black while questioning
its fairness was Brauninger v. Ducote,'7 in which the court denied
emotional damages to the mother of a minor child who was allegedly
raped by the son of the defendant. The fourth circuit suggested that
the inconsistency complained of by the Cambrice court could be elim-
inated: "Perhaps ... the Supreme Court will ... either reaffirm ...
or repudiate Black ... and the long line of appellate decisions. It would
appear that consistency would require either no recovery for emotional
stress for one's property damage or for one's child, or recovery in both
cases."'" The court implied that it would be more logical "to recognize
damages for emotional stress resulting from injury to one's child but
not to one's property, rather than the converse, as existing under the
present state of our jurisprudence."' 19
Another case which followed the Black opinion in its holding while
questioning its rationale was Blackwell v. Oser.20 In this case, the fourth
circuit refused recovery to a father who was in the delivery room and
witnessed the negligent injuring of his child by the obstetrician. However,
while denying recovery to the father, the fourth circuit allowed the
mother to recover mental anguish for the injury to the child under the
theory that an independent duty was owed to her. 21 In an impassioned
and well-reasoned plea urging the supreme court to vacate the Black
jurisprudence, the Blackwell court carefully detailed the reasons the
father in this situation should recover the mental anguish he sustained. 22
Most notably the court stated, "Thus we arrive at the fundamental
unsoundness of the doctrine announced in Black: inasmuch as the policy
reasons underlying the rule are now highly questionable ... such an
absolute bar obliterates the importance of 'foreseeability of harm', and
thus does violence to our long-held notion of duty." '23
After denouncing the Black rule, the court said:
[W]e are bound by a doctrine that has been followed in countless
cases, and although Black's premises have not been even briefly
discussed by our Supreme Court since 1917 (in Kaufman v.
Clark, 141 La. 316, 75 So. 65), the persistent denial of writ
"It would be highly illogical to allow damages for mental anguish caused by injury to
ones [sic] automobile ... and refuse to allow damages for mental suffering caused by
injuries to ones [sic] child."
17. 381 So. 2d 1246 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
18. Id. at 1248.
19. Id.
20. 436 So. 2d 1293 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
21. See also Spencer v. Terebelo, 373 So. 2d 200 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979) (establishing
this independent duty theory as an exception to Black).
22. Blackwell, 436 So. 2d at 1294-99.
23. Id. at 1298.
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applications signals that we are to assume the continuing validity
of the rule.Y
C. Some Courts Allow Bystander Recovery for Injury to Another
Still other Louisiana courts have ignored or distinguished Black,
and, thus, have allowed mental anguish damages for witnessing injury
to another. For example, in 1951, in Valence v. Louisiana Power and
Light Co.,25 a mother and father were allowed mental anguish damages
for worrying that their unborn fetus might have been hurt or aborted
in a bus wreck. The Valence court made no mention of Black and based
its holding mainly on logic and similar decisions in other states.
26
In 1956, in a case similar to Valence, the second circuit, in Jordan
v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.,27 allowed a father to recover for his anxiety
and worry over possible injury to his unborn child. In Jordan, the
father suffered physical injuries in the same accident where his pregnant
wife was injured. The Jordan court cited the Valence opinion as authority
for its decision, and made no mention of Black.
28
In Holland v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co.,29 the parents who
brought the suit likewise recovered mental anguish damages for worrying
about their child. In Holland, a child ate rat poison, and his parents
incurred emotional injuries brought on by worry when the exterminator
delayed in informing them of the nature of the poison. Holland has
been distinguished as not being a total deviation from Black since
Holland specifically stated that it was an exception to the Black rule
for "those instances wherein a plaintiff suing for mental pain and anguish
occasioned by physical injury to another does so on the basis of a
breach of a primary legal duty and obligation owed by the defendant
directly to the plaintiff seeking such damages." 30 The Holland court
saw the duty of the exterminator to be a duty arising out of the
exterminator's contract with the parents.3'
24. Id. at 1299.
25. 50 So. 2d 847 (La. App. Orl. 1951).
26. Id. at 853-54. Although it might be argued that this case is distinguishable in
that the fetus is not a true person and so might fit under the allowance of mental anguish
damages for negligent injury to property, the court here made no attempt to equate the
fetus with property. It is also interesting to note that the father in this case was allowed
mental anguish damages for his worry even though he was not present or injured at the
time of the bus wreck.
27. 90 So. 2d 531 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956).
28. Id. at 532. See also Champagne v. Hearty, 76 So. 2d 453 (La. App. Orl. 1954)
(mother received damages for anxiety over possible harm to her unborn child).
29. 135 So. 2d 145 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
30. Id. at 158-59.
31. Id. at 158.
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In Shelmire v. Linton,3 2 the plaintiffs recovered damages for mental
anguish resulting from the exposure and reinterment of their parents'
bodies after a motorist negligently knocked down the burial vaults in
which the bodies were housed. In this case, the appellate court used
the Louisiana duty-risk test and decided that both drivers involved had
a duty to avoid the accident, and that this duty "was designed to protect
innocent third parties against the particular risk involved in this acci-
dent." ' 3  In Shelmire, mental anguish damages were awarded to two
people who actually saw the overturned burial vault and the "remains
of their respective parents. '3 4 The court further expanded the duty of
the tortfeasor to award mental anguish damages to another child who
said that he was aware of the accident, but who had not actually seen
the exhumed bodies.
In Skorlich v. East Jefferson General Hospital,5 in a factual situation
almost identical to the fourth circuit Blackwell case, the fifth circuit
court did allow the father in the delivery room to recover damages for
mental anguish he suffered when he witnessed the negligent injuring of
his child at the hands of the defendant obstetrician. The Skorlich court
followed the duty-risk analysis through which the Blackwell court had
found that the obstetrician's duty extended only as far as the mother.
However, the Skorlich court stretched the duty of the doctor not to
injure the child one step further to include the father when it said,
[ajlthough the father does not carry the fetus within his own
body, it is his seed which created the fetus and thus imposed
on him the obligation to care, protect and raise [sic] the fetus
to adulthood. For that reason, the duty of the physician ...
is a duty owed to the father as well as to the mother.3 6
32. 343 So. 2d. 301 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
33. Id. at 305.
34. Id. Although the facts of this case do not specifically state the circumstances
under which the plaintiffs viewed the bodies, it can be assumed from the wording of the
opinion that the plaintiffs were not actually present at the time of the accident, but that
they were informed of the damage and then went to the scene.
35. 478 So. 2d 916 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985).
36. Id. at 918. It is interesting to note at this point that the Mesa court made no
mention of the Skorlich case in its opinion. Instead, the fifth circuit, which decided both
Mesa and Skorlich, ignored its own jurisprudence (Skorlich), which specifically had rejected
the Blackwell opinion, and chose instead to cite the fourth circuit's Blackwell opinion as
its main jurisprudential authority in the mental anguish portion of Mesa. It is also ironic
that the Mesa court uses Blackwell as support for their statement that: "Although we,
like our brothers on the Blackwell court, find the [Black] rule often harsh, we are
nonetheless bound by it until . . . it is revised or abolished by the Supreme Court or the
legislature." Mesa, 506 So. 2d 121, 124 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1987).
1010 [Vol. 48
NOTES
D. The Rationale Behind Black
The Black decision must be assessed as to its viability, given the
conditions which exist in modern society. The Black court based its
ruling on the feared consequence of allowing bystanders to recover for
witnessing injury to another, specifically, that the tortfeasor would be
subject to greater or fewer claims against him "in proportion to the
larger or smaller circle of [the victim's] friends". 3 7 The court's concern
was that the liability of the tortfeasor would be unpredictable if by-
standers were allowed to recover.38 Looking at this "indefinite number
of claims" argument more closely, it is sensed that the court in Black
was concerned that if bystanders were allowed to recover, unfounded
claims might inundate the courts, 39 that people who had suffered no
actual injury would try to claim some mental anguish damages, or that
they would overstate the severity of their emotional hurt.
However, courts have realized that mental anguish damages are
"actual damages" 4 which can be quantified by judges and juries who
rely on common experience to assess the injury. Academicians also assert
the reality of mental anguish damages as true damages. Prosser and
Keeton point out that:
Mental suffering is no more difficult to estimate in financial
terms, and no less a real injury, than 'physical' pain; it is not
an independent intervening cause, but a thing brought about by
the defendant's negligence itself, . . . and while it may be true
that its consequences are seldom very serious unless there is
some predisposing physical condition, the law is not for the
protection of the physically sound alone. It is the business of
the courts to make precedent where a wrong calls for redress,
even if lawsuits must be multiplied; and there has long been
precedent enough, and no great increase in litigation has been
observed .41
E. Parents as an Exception to Black
It has been shown that some Louisiana courts are uncomfortable with
a blanket rule such as that expressed in Black, which disallows mental
37. Black v. Carrollton R.R., 10 La. Ann. 33, 39 (1855).
38. Id. Also, for more reasons used by courts to support the Black decision and for
criticisms of the modern-day applicability of these reasons see Stone, Louisiana Tort
Doctrine: Emotional Distress Occasioned by Another's Peril, 48 Tul. L. Rev. 782, 789-
92 (1974).
39. Stone, supra note 38, at 791.
40. Bank of New Orleans v. Phillips, 415 So. 2d 973 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982).
41. W. Prosser & W. Keeton, The Law of Torts § 54, at 360 (5th ed. 1984) (footnotes
omitted).
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anguish to all bystanders. The courts recognize that there are certain
personal relationships which are so intimate that physical injury to one
party in the relationship will often lead to actual mental anguish on
the part of the other party who witnesses the injury.42 These relationships
are those traditionally close ones, such as the parent-child relationship.
Judges and jurors can draw on their own experiences to evaluate the
likelihood and severity of grief occurring when one member in the parent-
child relationship is injured.
Of course, there are also situations where the parent and child are
not particularly close, and as such, a blanket rule of allowing all parents
to recover for witnessing injuries to their children may be overcompen-
satory. The particular closeness of the parent and child may be disputed
by the defendant in court, and the jury may decide not to award these
damages to estranged children and parents. However, the tort goals of
compensating true injury, while denying recovery to those whose claims
or alleged losses are simply strategic, are better served by making the
recovery turn on the facts rather than on a rule of law which mandates
a blanket denial of the victim's claim.
JURISPRUDENCE OF OTHER STATES
Other states have confronted the question of who should be allowed
to recover damages for witnessing injury to another. Some states use
"the impact rule" and limit recovery of emotional damages to bystanders
who are themselves physically injured by the tortfeasor's negligence.4 3
Other states have adopted a "zone-of-danger" test in which bystanders
who are threatened with physical injury as a result of the negligence of
another are allowed to recover mental anguish damages." Still other
states allow bystanders to recover if it is foreseeable that they will suffer
some emotional harm, and if they are related to the accident victim. 41
The Restatement (Second) of Torts follows the traditional idea that
a plaintiff may not recover emotional damages for harm to another
unless the witness is himself harmed or threatened with harm by the
negligent conduct. 6 The Restatement, however, creates an exception to
this general "no recovery without physical impact" rule when it allows
42. The category of "witnesses" may be limited to those actually present when the
injury in question took place (as in Skorlich), or it may be expanded to include those
parties who were informed of the injury after it happened (as in Shelmire).
43. See Annot., Right to Recover Damages in Negligence for Fear of Injury to
Another, or Shock or Mental Anguish at Witnessing Such Injury, 29 A.L.R. 3d 1337
(1970).
44. See Annotation, supra note 43.
45. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968).
46. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 313(l)-(2) (1965).
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recovery to bystanders who are family members of the victim and who
are present when the victim is injured even though there is no physical
harm to the bystander. Thus, the Restatement recognizes the special
likelihood that claims of mental anguish by family members who witness
injury to their relatives are likely to be sufficiently reliable such that
the jury can be encouraged to award compensation for them.
All of these methods for identifying which bystanders will be allowed
to recover mental anguish damages (and those who will not) go beyond
the Black rule. Identifying some "actual injury" to tie to the mental
anguish claim is an attempt to guarantee the likely validity of the
emotional damages claim. In other words, these rules attempt to lend
some predictability to who is entitled to assert a claim against the
tortfeasor, and thus address the Black court's fear that the population
of claimants is potentially infinite. 47 With the physical impact and zone-
of-danger tests, the mental anguish claim is more plausible and pre-
dictable since it is tied to either actual physical injury or threatened
physical injury. With the foreseeability test and the Restatement view,
the tortfeasor is more able to predict to whom he may be liable.
DUTY-RISK ANALYSIS
Some of the Louisiana courts which have not followed Black and
allowed mental anguish damages to be recovered4 have utilized the duty-
risk analysis. This method fits between the zone-of-danger test used by
some states and the foreseeability test used by others. Under the duty-
risk analysis, once it is established that the defendant's negligence was
a cause in fact of the harm, then damages are recoverable if the
"defendant breached a ... duty imposed to protect against the particular
risk involved." '49 In other words, the tortfeasor "owes a duty of care
to all persons who are foreseeably endangered by his conduct with respect
to all risk which makes the conduct unreasonably dangerous." 5
To determine whether or not a duty should be imposed on a tort-
feasor, various policy considerations must be explored. Professor Crowe
sets forth six factors of duty, which include: "(1) administrative; (2)
ease of association; (3) economic; (4) moral; (5) type of activity; and
47. Black v. Carrollton R.R., 10 La. Ann. 33, 39 (1855). Also, identifying an "actual
injury" furthers the public policy of limiting liability to reasonable levels, a policy evidenced
by the existence of prescriptive periods and limited duties.
48. 343 So. 2d 301 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977); 478 So. 2d 916 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1985).
49. Hill v. Lundin & Assoc., Inc., 256 So. 2d 620, 622 (1972).
50. Skorlich v. East Jefferson Gen. Hosp., 478 So. 2d 916, 917 (La. App. 5th Cir.
19881 1013
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(6) precedent or historical. ' ' 51 These factors can be applied to tortfeasors
such as Mr. Burke to determine whether or not a duty not to inflict
mental distress on bystanders, particularly family members, should be
imposed on these tortfeasors.
Crowe sees the administrative factor as requiring the court to ask
if "the imposition of a duty in a given situation [would] open the
floodgates to unmanagable litigation." 52 He then goes on to posit that
the courts have a legitimate right to be concerned "with a significant
number of fabricated claims in the area of mental distress because the
genuineness of a mental distress claim is often difficult to ascertain.""
While this is a legitimate concern, as discussed earlier, if bystander
mental anguish recoveries are limited to intimate family members, par-
ticularly parents, then it would be easier for the courts to find an
"actual" verifiable injury despite the illusive nature of "mental distress"
itself. 14
The ease of association factor is related to how easily the plaintiff's
alleged injury and the conduct of the tortfeasor can be associated."
Applying this test to defendants such as Burke, a close correlation can
be seen between the negligence which injures a child and the worry and
mental anguish suffered by the victim's parent. Also, it is certainly
foreseeable that a parent in Mrs. Mesa's situation would suffer mental
anguish upon witnessing an injury to her child. It is possible to imagine
cases in which the ease of association between the tortfeasor's negligence
and the mental anguish claimed by a bystander would not be readily
apparent. For example, a witness who was in no way related to the
victims of a car accident might indeed be disturbed by what he saw,
but his mental distress might not be as acute as that of a mother in
Mrs. Mesa's situation. A court might therefore choose not to extend
the duty of the defendant to include anyone other than a relative of
the victim or one actually physically harmed by the negligence of the
tortfeasor. Also, family member status alone should not be the deter-
mining factor in whether or not a claim is valid, rather the fact of
actual mental injury should also be considered. The actual relationship
between the bystander and the victim should be assessed by the trial
court. 56
51. Crowe, The Anatomy of a Tort-Greenian, as Interpreted by Crowe who has
been Influenced by Malone-a Primer, 22 Loy. L. Rev. 903, 906 (1976) (italics deleted).
52. Id. at 907.
53. Id.
54. See supra text accompanying note 42.
55. Crowe, supra note 51, at 907.
56. See supra text accompanying note 42.
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Exerting influence on the decisions of courts is which of the parties
involved is better able to bear the loss or avoid the loss.5 7 In a car
accident such as that which occurred in Mesa, it is possible that neither
of the parties is in a better position economically to bear the loss
associated with the mental anguish of the bystander. Both parties prob-
ably have automobile insurance policies, and Burke's insurance company
is named as a defendant in this suit. The question then is which of the
parties is better able to avoid the mental anguish loss. An argument
could be made that Mrs. Mesa should have been able to control her
emotions better so that the injury never would have occurred. However,
the stronger position is that the defendant had the ability to avoid the
accident altogether, especially since the accident in Mesa was stipulated
to be solely a result of his negligence." Therefore, one would assert
that Burke should bear the loss, since he had the most control over it.
Another factor which Crowe suggests involves looking at the type
of activity involved to determine whether or not a duty exists. This
factor takes into consideration whether the defendant's activity is so
dangerous as to have no social utility, or if the activity is one that has
so much social utility that it should be protected. 9 Although driving a
car certainly does have social utility, and therefore should not be subject
to strict liability, driving so negligently as to cause an accident is not
the type of activity that should be given a high measure of protection.
The final factor which Crowe enumerates for determining whether
or not a duty exists is the historical or precedent factor. This factor
involves examining what the rule in this area of the law was in the
past, analyzing the validity of the rule, and interpreting how the rule
applies in modern society.6 Here, defendants like Burke certainly have
the weight of the Black opinion on their side. However, as discussed
earlier, Black may have been at least partially eroded. 61
Louisiana courts have also examined the issue of who should have
a duty to the bystander claiming mental anguish damages and how far
this duty should extend. The Shelmire62 and Skorlich63 courts articulated
how far the duty of the tortfeasor should extend by including within
the tortfeasor's duty a child who heard about his parent's body being
57. Crowe, supra note 51, at 907-08.
58. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
59. Crowe, supra note 51, at 908.
60. Id.
61. See supra notes 15-24 and accompanying text.
62. 343 So. 2d 301 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
63. 478 So. 2d 916 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985).
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exhumed, and a father who saw the doctor negligently injure his child
in the delivery room. 64
Several other decisions in which mental anguish damages were denied
to a bystander help to define the outer boundaries of the scope of the
tortfeasor's duty in Louisiana. These opinions are nevertheless consistent
with the theory advanced here that bystander recovery may rationally
be limited to those in close relationship to the tort victim and whose
claims of actual loss are likely to be reliable. 65 For example, in Dierker
v. Gypsum Transportation Ltd. ,66 a repairman was not allowed damages
as a bystander for mental anguish where he was not subject to an
"unreasonable risk of bodily harm'' 67 and was not related to the accident
victim. Also, in LeConte v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. ,68 police
at the scene of an airplane crash were found to be "purely bystanders ' 69
and were denied mental distress damages for viewing crash victims.
How Mesa Could Fit Into These Theories
Applying these parameters to the Mesa case, the area of allowable
recovery envisioned by some Louisiana courts is one in which Mrs.
Mesa fits comfortably. Mrs. Mesa was physically injured and was in-
timately related to the victim, unlike the Dierker and LeConte cases
where bystanders who did not meet these criteria were denied recovery.
Surely an area of protection broad enough to encompass a father in a
delivery room 70 and a child who was just told about the disinterment
of his parent's body7' is likewise broad enough to include a mother like
the plaintiff in Mesa who is in the car with her daughter and who
believes. that the child died as a result of her injuries. Under a duty-
risk analysis, Mrs. Mesa appears to be one of the persons "foreseeably
endangered by his conduct. ' 72 Also, the duty of the tortfeasor not to
crash into Mrs. Mesa's car and injure either her or her daughter was
designed to protect Mrs. Mesa from the actual injury she suffered here. 73
64. 343 So. 2d 301 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977); 478 So. 2d 916 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1985).
65. See also Mayo v. Borden, Inc., 784 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1986) (worker was not
allowed to recover for mental or emotional pain and suffering for witnessing co-worker's
injuries).
66. 606 F. Supp. 566 (E.D. La. 1985).
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If Louisiana courts are uncomfortable with the breadth of the duty-
risk analysis as applied here, they might allow parental recovery in cases
like Mesa by looking to the jurisprudence of other states. 74 There the
court would find that Mrs. Mesa also fits into all three of the categories
used by other states to allow bystander recovery. She is physically injured
under the impact rule, she is threatened with physical injury within the
zone-of-danger test, and she is a relative of the accident victim fore-
seeably subject to risk under Dillon and the Restatement exception.
CONCLUSION
The question of whether or not to allow emotional recovery to a
witness of an injury to a third party is not easily answered. Different
states have developed various theories to allow compensation where
deserved, while at the same time, these theories do not subject the
tortfeasor to a never-ending line of possible strategic claims. Upon
looking at the litany of Louisiana cases in this area, a sense of the
uncertainty is apparent in the appellate courts as to just exactly what
the law is on this issue. Some courts follow Black, while others have
developed their own theories to allow what they see as justified recov-
eries. The weight of respectable opinion is that the Louisiana Supreme
Court should alleviate the confusion in this area by making a modern
pronouncement either reaffirming Black and its progeny or adopting
some modification of the Black position. However, until the supreme
couri or the legislature clarify this area, the cases and theories set forth
in this note help identify several possible cracks in the previously im-
movable wall of Black which may aid parental plaintiffs or trap unwary
negligent tortfeasor defendants. May the most convincing party win.
Carolyn Jeanelle Smilie
74. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
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